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Abstract 
POLITICIZATION, PARTY POLITICS AND MILITARY MISSIONS 
Deployment Votes in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
 
by Wolfgang Wagner, Anna Herranz-Surrallés, Juliet Kaarbo and Falk Ostermann 
This paper examines whether decisions at the core of international security politics, namely 
decisions on the deployment of military forces, have undergone a process of politicization. It is 
guided by two interrelated questions, namely a) whether deployment decisions have been 
politically contested and b) what kind of party-political cleavage has emerged in this process. We 
examine data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) as well as data that we gathered on 
parliamentary votes on deployment decisions in France, Germany, Spain and the United 
Kingdom. We find that military deployments have indeed been contested amongst political 
parties. Further and notwithstanding country-specific peculiarities, we find that the party-
political cleavage is by and large captured by the left/right-axis. 
Keywords: party-political contestation, parliamentary vote, foreign policy  
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Zusammenfassung 
POLITISIERUNG, PARTEIPOLITIK UND MILITÄREINSÄTZE 
Einsatzentscheidungen in Frankreich, Deutschland, Spanien und dem Vereinigten Königreich 
Großbritannien 
 
von Wolfgang Wagner, Anna Herranz-Surrallés, Juliet Kaarbo und Falk Ostermann 
Dieses Arbeitspapier untersucht, ob Entscheidungen über den Einsatz von Streitkräften als 
Kernbereich internationaler Sicherheitspolitik einem Politisierungsprozess unterworfen sind. 
Wir benutzen Daten des Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) sowie von uns selbst gesammelte Daten 
von Parlamentsabstimmungen zu Einsatzentscheidungen in Deutschland, Frankreich, 
Großbritannien und Spanien, um zwei Fragen nachzugehen: erstens, ob Einsatzentscheidungen 
politisch kontrovers waren; und zweitens, welche Art parteipolitischer Auseinandersetzung und 
Trennungslinien dabei zu erkennen sind. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen zum einen, dass militärische 
Einsatzentscheidungen tatsächlich parteipolitisch umstritten waren. Zum anderen wird trotz 
verbleibender länderspezifischer Unterschiede deutlich, dass sich diese Politisierung 
größtenteils an einer parteipolitischen links-rechts-Achse entlang bewegt. 
Stichwörter: Militäreinsätze, politische Parteien, Politisierung, Parlamentee  
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INTRODUCTION
1
 
Scholars of international relations have noted a trend towards politicization (Zürn 2014). 
Decisions are no longer simply accepted, but instead are increasingly salient and publicly 
contested. The politicization and partisanship of international politics has been best documented 
in the areas of trade, development, environment and public health. In this paper, we examine 
whether decisions at the core of international security politics, namely decisions on the 
deployment of military forces, have undergone a process of politicization as well. Our analysis 
focuses on European democracies. It is guided by two interrelated questions, namely a) whether 
deployment decisions have been politically contested and b) what kind of party-political 
cleavages have emerged in this process. 
We use two types of data to examine whether and in what way the deployment of military forces 
has been contested amongst political parties: first, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) provides 
us with data on experts’ estimates of political parties’ positions in 31 European countries. In 
particular, we use the two latest CHES rounds in 2010 and 2014 which include a question on 
peace and security missions (Bakker et al. 2015a). Second, we have gathered data on 
parliamentary votes on deployment decisions in France, Germany, Spain and the United 
Kingdom (Section 4). Both types of data capture the entire spectrum of military deployments 
ranging from peacekeeping and observer missions to actual combat. Both types of data suit this 
paper’s interest in political parties’ general position on military missions, rather than their 
position on specific deployments. Whereas the CHES data come with the advantage of covering a 
large number of countries, the voting data provide us with further insights into the degree of 
contestation between and within political parties. Before we turn to data analysis, we discuss 
why we might expect party political differences over the use of military force.  
                                              
1
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the workshop “Legislatures and foreign affairs: political 
parties, committees, and individual MPs” at the University of Tampere, 14 April, 2016, at the “Research on 
International Security and Conflict“-seminar at the University of Amsterdam on 20 April 2016, at the 
convention of the Central and Eastern European International Studies Association in Ljubljana on 24 June 
2016 and at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin on 28 July 2016. The authors are grateful to Sebastian 
Bödeker, Brian Burgoon, Aron Buzogany, Pieter de Wilde, Benjamin Faude, Piet Hays Gries, Dieuwertje 
Kuijpers, Matthias Kranke, Onawa Lacewell, Thomas Malang, Kai Oppermann, Trineke Palm, Brian Rathbun, 
Christian Rauh, Tapio Raunio, Mathew Stephen, Alexandros Tokhi, Paul van Hooft, Gijsbert van Iterson 
Scholten, Mariken van der Velden and Michael Zürn for useful comments and suggestions. 
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MILITARY MISSIONS AND CONTESTATION AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES
2
 
Traditionally, neither students of international relations nor their colleagues in comparative 
politics expect a great deal of party political contestation over foreign policy. International 
Relations scholars are trained to think in terms of ‘national interests’, rather than 
conceptualizing competing party political visions over foreign policy. Comparative politics 
scholars emphasize that the emergence of political parties is best understood as a response to 
domestic conflict (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), whereas conflicts over foreign and security politics 
do not figure prominently in explanations of party systems (with Ireland as a noteworthy 
exception). With a view to military missions, sociologists of conflict have pointed out that group 
cohesion indeed increases in the face of an external threat. According to Georg Simmel, ‘war 
with the outside is sometimes the last chance for a state, ridden with inner antagonisms to 
overcome these antagonisms, or else break up indefinitely’ (1955:93; see also Levine & Campbell 
1972; and Huddy 2013). Students of foreign policy have confirmed that international crises bring 
about, at least temporarily, a “rally-around-the-flag” effect (Waltz 1967:273; Oneal et al 1996) 
that makes criticism of the government look inappropriate. In a similar vein, the Copenhagen 
School in Security Studies propose that the “securitization” of an issue – i.e. its framing as a 
matter of security – takes it beyond “normal politics”. Taken together, the “politics stops at the 
water’s edge”-paradigm suggests that dissenting votes on deployment decisions are rather 
unlikely as such votes may transcend party politics and demonstrate national unity instead. 
More recently, however, research on foreign policy has suggested that foreign policy is indeed 
an important area of disagreement among political parties (see, for example, Kaarbo 1996, 2012; 
Thérien & Noël 2000; Ozkececi-Taner 2005; Schuster & Maier 2006; Chryssogelos 2015; Joly & 
Dandoy 2016). Students of political parties and security policy have suggested three rationales 
why political parties differ on military missions. First, foreign policies may impact domestic 
policy programs because they compete for the same resources. Expenditure for the military 
competes with spending on other issues such as health care, education and social programs. For 
this reason, Koch and Sullivan (2010:619) argue that parties that promote the welfare state tend 
to oppose large armies, expensive military procurement as well as the actual use of armed force 
abroad.  
                                              
2
  This section builds on Wagner et al. 2017. 
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Second, political parties may have genuine foreign policy differences that have no discernible link 
to domestic politics. For example, Brian Rathbun (2004:19) argues that some parties believe in 
what Robert Jervis called the ‘deterrence’ model of international politics whereas others 
subscribe to what he dubs the ‘spiral’ model. According to the former, interests are best guarded 
by military strength and resolve; in contrast, the latter stresses empathy and ‘security dilemma 
sensitivity’ (Jervis 1976). Whereas the former translates into more ‘hawkish’ policies, the latter 
implies more ‘dovish’ ones (see also Schuster & Maier 2006; Williams 2014). 
Third, foreign policies may result from the same core values and principled beliefs that also 
inspire domestic policies. Rathbun suggests that liberty and equality are such core values and 
that ‘partisan debates can generally be reduced to fundamental disputes about the importance of 
equality and liberty, whether at home or abroad’ (2004:2). For example, parties emphasizing 
equality are concerned about minorities and the underprivileged and thus favour the welfare 
state as well as interventions on behalf of minorities and underprivileged abroad. Taken 
together, this leads us to expect that party political support for military missions differs 
systematically along a left/right axis (Laver & Budge 1993; Budge et al. 2001; Clare 2010; Wagner 
et al. 2017).  
Previous research on the influence of a government’s left/right orientation on the propensity to 
use military force has proceeded on the assumption that the relation would be linear (see, for 
example, Palmer et al. 2004). However, it is not obvious that a radical-right political party would 
be more supportive of military missions than a conservative or Christian Democratic party. The 
former may score higher on a general preparedness to use military force but it may also be 
more hesitant to use such force for any goal other than territorial defence (see the country 
studies in Liang 2007; Chryssogelos 2010; Verbeek & Zaslove 2015).  
Finally, ‘wars of choice’ may even transcend the left/right logic entirely. If military force is 
justified by governments as ‘saving strangers’ (Wheeler 2000) from state-sponsored violence (as 
in Kosovo 1999 and in Libya 2011), to topple a dictatorship (as in Iraq in 2003) or to support a 
state and nation-building process (as in Afghanistan from 2001 on), the justifications resonate 
with ‘post-materialist’ values that are characteristic of a cultural cleavage, rather than the socio-
economic one. In exploring this alternative hypothesis, we make use of the new politics 
dimension, conceptualized by Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole Wilson (2002) that ranges 
from ‘green/alternative/libertarian’ (GAL) to ‘traditional/authoritarian/nationalist’ (TAN) party 
positions. For example, this GAL/TAN scale is found to capture the structure of contestation on 
European integration better than the traditional left-right scale (ibid). An alternative expectation 
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therefore is that party political support for military missions differs systematically along a 
green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) dimension.  
The next section problematizes and investigates the nature of the relationship between political 
parties’ positions on peace and security missions. We explore both left/right and GAL/TAN 
dimensions and the differences between party families’ support for military missions. 
MAPPING POLITICAL PARTIES’ POSITIONS ON MILITARY MISSIONS 
In this section we examine data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). In 2014, the CHES 
asked more than 300 experts to map the positions of 268 political parties in 31 European 
countries. Figure 1 visualizes political parties’ support for peace and security missions
3
 and their 
position on a left/right axis in 2014.
4
  
With regard to politicization and partisanship, Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that peace and 
security missions are contested. Considerable numbers of parties can be found amongst the 
supporters (6 and above on the y-axis) as well as amongst the opponents (4 and below on the y-
axis). A comparison of average values with CHES 2010 data reveals that the average level of 
support has remained almost unchanged (5,02 in 2014 vs. 5,01 in 2010). 
                                              
3
  Under the heading ‘position towards international security and peace keeping missions’, experts are 
asked to determine a political party’s position on a scale from 0 (‘strongly favours COUNTRY troop 
deployment’) to 10 (‘strongly opposes COUNTRY troop deployment’). For this article we have reversed the 
scale and re-coded the ‘international_security’ variable into a support_mission variable that ranges 
from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly favours). 
4
  0 indicates extreme left and 10 extreme right. We have reversed the scale used by the CHES so 0 means 
that a country’s troop deployment is strongly opposed whereas 10 means it is strongly favoured (y-axis). 
It is important to note that the parties plotted in 2014 are not entirely identical with those in 2010: 
some may not have been re-elected into parliament while others may have been newly established. To 
maximize comparability over time, however, parties from Cyprus, Malta and Luxemburg, which were 
included in the 2014 survey, were manually excluded because these three countries were not part of the 
2010 survey, either. Figure 1 thus plots 253 political parties in 28 countries. 
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Figure 1: Mapping of political parties’ positions on military missions and on a left/right-scale, 
2014 
 
R2 = 0,36; p < 0,000 
Because the CHES data gathered political parties’ positions on numerous issues, we can compare 
the variance of positions on peace and security missions with those on other issues. With a score 
of 3,4, variance on peace and security missions is lower than variance on environmental issues 
(4.2), redistribution (4,5), civil liberties/law and order (5,5), immigration (5,7) or social lifestyle 
(7,9). This indicates that peace and security missions are less contested amongst political parties 
than are many other political issues.  
The CHES data are particularly useful to examine our second question, namely what kind of 
party-political cleavage has emerged. In a previous study, we used data from the 2010 Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to demonstrate that party political contestation over military missions 
follows a curvilinear left/right pattern (Wagner et al. 2017). The 2014 CHES data allow us to 
examine whether our previous findings hold for 2014 as well. Figure 1 demonstrates that they 
do. In terms of the left/right cleavage, the correlation is indeed curvilinear: using a quadratic 
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model, the correlation is statistically significant at the 0,001 level with a r2 of 0,36 (2014).5 
Support for peace and security missions increases as one moves from the left to the centre-right 
and declines again towards the radical right. 
We also examine whether the GAL/TAN scale captures party political contestation over military 
missions.
6
 As in 2010, the GAL/TAN scale is also highly significant but it explains less variation 
than the left/right scale (for 2014, r2 equals 0,15). Compared to 2010, the differences in variation 
explained have declined (0,36/0,15 for 2014 vs. 0,35/0,11). Additional data from future surveys is 
needed to judge whether this is a significant trend. 
Finally, we draw on the notion of party families to cluster parties into groups with shared core 
values and interests. We examine whether there are significant differences across party families. 
We exclude the ‘Confessional/Protestant’, ‘Agrarian’ and ‘Regionalist/Ethnic’ party families as 
well as all parties that are coded as not belonging to any family. Furthermore, we merged the 
party families ‘Conservatives’ and ‘Christian Democrats’ into one category because they occupy 
comparable positions on both the left-right scale as well as on military missions, and they do not 
compete with each other in any of the countries studied in depth below. For most parts of our 
analysis, therefore, we zoom in on the differences between the main party families, namely 
Conservatives/Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals, Greens, Radical Left and Radical Right.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
5
  A linear model is also statistically highly significant at the 0,001 level but the r2 is much lower (0,165 in 
2014). 
6  In order to map political parties’ position on a left/right axis, experts are asked ‘Please tick the box that 
best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme 
right). On GAL/TAN, experts are asked: ‘Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic 
freedoms and rights. Libertarian or post-materialist parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for 
example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. 
Traditional or authoritarian parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, 
and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues’ (Bakker 
et al. 2015b: 144). 0 indicates extreme GAL and 10 extreme TAN. 
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Figure 2: Boxplot of party families’ support for peace and security missions 
 
Figure 2 and Table 1 examine differences in support for military missions across the main party 
families for 2010 and 2014.
7
 As the boxplot visualizes and as the ANOVA analysis demonstrates, 
party families systematically differ in the degree to which they favour their country’s 
participation in peace and security missions. As a comparison of the standard deviations shows, 
differences within most party families increased, thus pointing to higher levels of contestation. 
The boxplot further confirms the analysis above: support for peace and security missions follows 
a curvilinear pattern and is lowest amongst radical-left parties. Green parties are more 
supportive than radical-left parties, and Socialist parties are more supportive than Greens and 
radical-left ones. Support is highest amongst Liberals and Christian Democrats/Conservatives. 
The Radical Right is about as supportive as the Greens. Although the boxplot shows considerable 
                                              
7
  Data on party families are made available in the “trendfiles”, which, in contrast to the data used for 
Figures 1 and 2, exclude political parties from Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. In addition, political 
parties from Cyprus, Luxemburg and Malta are missing for 2010. To maximize comparability, we 
manually excluded them for 2014 as well. 
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variation within party families, the ANOVA analysis reported below demonstrates that 
differences between party families are statistically highly significant. The data also suggests that 
the gap between the Radical Left as the main party family opposing peace and security missions 
and the parties of the centre is widening, rather than narrowing down. 
Table 1: ANOVA analysis of support for peace and security missions across party families 
 
DEPLOYMENT VOTES IN PARLIAMENT 
Building on our analyses of the CHES data, in this section, we assess parliamentary votes on 
deployment decisions to examine whether they have been politically contested and what kind of 
party-political cleavage has emerged in this process. We collected data on a total of 183 roll-call 
votes
8
 in plenaries for the period between 1991 and August 2016 in France, Germany, Spain and 
the United Kingdom (Tables 3 to 6 list the specific votes per country).
9
 We first examine the 
annual number of votes over the period 1991-2015 as an indicator of politicization. We then 
examine the degree of cross-party consensus and contestation through an agreement index. We 
subsequently turn to analyse the share of no-votes per party and legislature in the four 
                                              
8
  Strictly speaking, the votes we study are not roll-call votes because individual MPs are not called to 
indicate their vote (as practiced in the US Congress). Instead, individual MPs’ votes are usually recorded 
electronically or by way of voting cards (for an overview see Saalfeld 1995).  
9
  All data can be retrieved from www.deploymentvotewatch.eu. 
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countries under study to find out whether there is any common pattern of party-political 
contestation. Finally, we discuss more in detail the deployment votes in each country. This 
allows us to explore the commonalities and country-specific differences across the votes and 
missions.  
Rising numbers of deployment votes 
One indication of the politicization of military deployments is the growing number of 
deployment votes in the four countries for which we collected data.
 
As Figure 3 shows, the vast 
majority of these votes have been held in the German Bundestag but the overall upward trend is 
not limited to Germany: In the UK, deployment votes have become more common in the wake of 
the 2003 Iraq War (Kaarbo & Kenealy 2017) and have even led some to see this as a new 
convention (Strong 2014; Mello 2017). In Spain and in France, deployment votes have been 
introduced via a new deployment law (Spain in 2005) and a constitutional reform (France in 
2008) respectively (see below).  
Figure 3: Number of annual deployment votes, 1991-2015 
 
The growing number of deployment votes indicates that deployment of military forces is not 
considered as “dictated” by international events but as a political decision that requires public 
justification. Even when votes are not constitutionally required, parliaments are increasingly 
0
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seeking to extend their role and PMs are feeling the political need for the legitimacy of 
parliamentary approval. 
Agreement and contestation in parliament 
Another indicator for the politicization of deployment decisions is the degree of dissent recorded 
in deployment votes. Especially for MPs from parties of the opposition, voting against a 
government proposal is anything but unusual – as long as domestic politics is concerned. To 
investigate the degree of dissent, we calculate an agreement index (AI) that Hix, Noury and 
Roland (2005) originally developed to measure party cohesion in the European Parliament.
10
 The 
AI equals 1 when all MPs vote together and it equals 0 when they are equally divided between 
the voting options. This index has become an established measure to assess the unity of groups 
within legislatures – mostly political parties –, but in studies of the European Parliament also 
members of the same country. To our knowledge, the AI has not been used to measure degrees of 
consensus within a parliament as a whole,
11
 most likely because the recording of individual 
votes already is a sign of contestation; uncontroversial parliamentary decisions are often 
adopted without the time-consuming recording of individual votes. Moreover, parliaments differ 
enormously in the ways they vote, with some often recording votes and others doing so only 
rarely (Saalfeld 1995). Hence, recorded votes may be a very unrepresentative sample of all votes 
in a parliament (Carruba, Gabel & Hug 2008). Yet for the purposes of this study, the AI allows an 
assessment of the degree of dissent on all military mission votes in our four countries and a 
comparison with the degree of dissent on other matters.  
Our study of roll call votes on military missions shows that degrees of politicization of military 
missions differ across the four countries under study: whereas decisions in Spain are highly 
consensual, those in the UK have been highly controversial. With the exception of the Cameron II 
cabinet, levels of politicization of military missions in all four countries are clearly lower than 
those for other legislative business.
12
 Agreement tends to be higher when left parties that tend 
to vote against deployments are in government.  
                                              
10
  The precise formula is:       
11
  Students of the US Congress typically measure bipartisanship as ‘the extent to which majorities or near 
majorities of both parties in Congress vote together’ (Kupchan & Trubowitz 2007:11).  
12
  For the calculation of the Agreement index for recorded votes on other business, data on Germany and 
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Party political cleavages in deployment votes 
The actual votes confirm the importance of the left/right-cleavage. Whereas the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey data pointed to a curvilinear relationship, the roll call votes in these four 
countries suggest a linear relationship. As Figure 4 demonstrates, the average share of no-votes 
is highest among parties of the Radical Left and lowest among those of the Radical Right, 
followed closely by Christian-Democrats and Conservatives with Greens, Socialists and Liberals 
in between. However, the boxes and whiskers also indicate that there is a considerable spread: 
radical-left, Green and liberal parties have all voted both unanimously for and against military 
deployments throughout a particular legislature. Additionally, the Radical Right is only 
                                                                                                                                             
on France are taken from the homepages of the Bundestag 
(https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/datenhandbuch/datenhandbuch_archiv, last accessed 14 July 
2016) and the Assemblée nationale (http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/scrutins/liste/%28legislature%29/14, last accessed September 2016), data on the UK from 
Firth & Spirling (2003) and from publicwhip (http://www.publicwhip.org.uk; last accessed September 
2016). Because voting data for the Spanish Congreso had to be imputed manually, we decided to limit our 
sample to votes on adopted legislative acts and to exclude votes on amendments and non-legislative 
business. The data were retrieved from 
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Iniciativas/LeyesAprob, last accessed 16 
September 2016).  
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represented in France and in one government in the UK in our sample, and with very little votes 
in both cases.  
Figure 4: Average share of no-votes across party families in the four countries under study 
 
In a study on voting in the foreign affairs committee of the German Bundestag, Leuffen and 
Malang (2011) argued that MPs’ voting is influenced by their affiliation with either the governing 
majority or the opposition. As Figure 5 demonstrates, our data confirm that membership in 
government has a statistically significant (p < 0,001) impact on the number of no-votes: the 
average number of no-votes per party per legislature drops from 42,8% (in opposition) to 2,4% 
(in government).
13
 Outliers all come from the UK: In 2003, 84 out of 338 Labour MPs voted against 
their own government on the Iraq war. Whilst part of the Cameron/Clegg government, Liberal 
Democrats mostly voted with the government but the average number of no-votes is driven up 
                                              
13
 This test includes lower chambers only and thus excludes the French Sénat. 
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by 10 out of 42 Liberal Democrats voting against their own government on a possible Syrian 
intervention in 2013. 
Figure 5: Comparison of average share of no-votes between parties in government and parties 
in opposition in the four countries under study 
 
This begs the question whether the requirements of governing make party-political differences 
melt away entirely. An ANOVA analysis of the average share of no-votes across party families in 
government indeed suggests that differences between parties are not significant. It should be 
noted, however, that there is a strong selection effect: by way of intra-coalition (or, in case of 
single-party governments, intra-party) bargaining, parties in government can prevent proposals 
to deploy troops from getting on the parliamentary agenda in the first place, or they may trade 
their support for concessions on the actual mandate of the deployment. In other words: parties 
in government may vote in favour of deployments because they managed to pre-select only 
deployments they support. 
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Country Studies 
In this section, we analyse voting data available for Germany, France, Spain, and the UK. Together 
these four countries account for approximately two thirds of defence spending in the EU. Across 
the four countries under study, the practice of voting on military missions differs enormously. 
Whereas MPs in Germany voted more than 140 times, British MPs did so only six times, 
indicating widely differing interpretations of the circumstances under which a vote would be 
necessary or politically desirable. We now provide an overview of votes on military missions per 
country and then turn to interesting differences and commonalities among them. 
France 
The French parliament was only endowed with voting rights on military operations (opérations 
extérieures – OPEX) through the constitutional reform of 2008. Nevertheless, in January 1991, 
President Mitterrand decided to have a parliament vote on the French contribution to the Gulf 
War even though military deployments were the exclusive competence of the President. The new 
formulation of Article 35 of the French constitution now endows parliament with the right to 
vote on the extension of military operations if they reach beyond four months (for a discussion 
see Ostermann 2017). As of 31 August 2016, almost a dozen votes have been taken for missions 
to Iraq (1991), Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Lebanon, Chad, Libya, Mali, the Central African 
Republic (CAR), and against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. 
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As to the distribution of no-votes, we can recognize big differences between the conservative-
liberal presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy and the socialist-left ones of Mitterrand and Hollande. 
Mitterrand’s decision to contribute to the 1991 Gulf War found broad support. The same holds for 
the missions in Mali, the CAR and against Daesh in Iraq and Syria during Hollande’s presidential 
term. In contrast, during Sarkozy’s presidency, a left/right cleavage is more clearly discernible 
with considerable numbers of MPs from the radical left, the Greens and the Socialist Party voting 
against. As expected, these numbers decrease considerably the further we move to the centre 
and the political right. During Sarkozy’s presidency, the Socialists are split in two, while liberal 
and conservative lawmakers generally support operations with only zero to 3,2 per cent of no-
votes throughout all three presidencies.  
Contrary to the curvilinear support for peace and security missions that the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey found across the political spectrum, the Front national voted in support of extending the 
mandates. However, these results must be taken with a pinch of salt, as they are only based on a 
very small number of votes and parliamentarians alike.  
A closer look at the Socialist vote reveals big differences across military missions: whereas 175 
Socialists in the Assemblée nationale and 87 socialist senators voted against the Afghanistan 
mission extension in 2008, only one Socialist in the Assemblée nationale voted against Libya in 
2011, and no senator at all. This opposition can be explained with doubts about the usefulness of 
the Afghanistan mission and the widening of its mandate, which were further aggravated by the 
death of ten French soldiers in an ambush in August 2008, shortly before the vote took place. 
Finally, the decision of Sarkozy to expand the French ISAF forces by 1.000 troops (what comes 
close to half of the former force size) without prior consultation of parliament strongly angered 
the opposition. With regard to the Greens, all representatives and senators voted against the 
Afghanistan mission; for the Libyan mission, the vote was split 2:2 in the Assemblée nationale, 
whereas all Green senators supported the mission or abstained.
14
  
The French case suggests that the government/opposition logic partly supersedes the left/right 
cleavage. For some missions such as in Mali and against Daesh, however, parties across the 
entire political spectrum are highly supportive, indicating an at least partial consensus about the 
use of force in French foreign policy. The voting patterns also indicate, however, that 
                                              
14
  The green Anny Poursinoff had been elected in a partial election in the meantime. On Libya see 
Ostermann, 2016. 
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politicization is on the rise. When five missions got formally extended in January 2009 (the 
second time only that such a vote took place after the constitutional changes in 2008), for 
instance, the board of presidents of the Assemblée nationale did not even opt for a roll-call vote 
but for a mere show of hands, whereas the Sénat already took a roll call. All later extension 
votes, however, were conducted by roll call in both chambers. Additionally, the Socialists and 
Greens in the Sénat did not participate at all in the votes on the same five extensions, as the 
procedure has been pushed swiftly through the parliamentary agenda without sufficient time 
for deliberation. This suggests that there is increasing political awareness as to the need to 
discuss missions sufficiently.  
Germany 
In a landmark ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 declared that deployments of the 
Bundeswehr require the prior approval of the Bundestag (see also for the following Paulus & 
Jacobs 2012). Since then, the Bundestag has voted more than 140 times on Germany’s 
contributions to military missions. In 2004, the Bundestag adopted a deployment law that 
codifies the then established practice. In a series of further rulings on borderline cases, the 
Federal Constitutional Court has followed a “parliamentary-friendly” interpretation and 
established a low threshold for what requires parliamentary approval. The high number of votes 
results from a low threshold above which parliamentary approval is required and the 
requirement to approve not only initial deployments but also their extension every year. 
Table 4: Analysis of Roll Call Votes in Germany 
               * = in government 
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The data in Table 3 are in line with the findings of the CHES survey: Support for military 
missions grows as we move from left to right. In contrast to France and the UK, however, there 
has never been any representative of a radical right party in the Bundestag. As a consequence, we 
cannot say whether support for military missions is curvilinear, as CHES finds, or linear, as the 
few votes in France and the UK suggest.  
For the parties represented in parliament, a left/right pattern is very clear. As in France and 
Spain, the Radical Left opposes military deployments most consistently. Exceptions are the 5 MPs 
of Die Linke who voted in favour of the Bundeswehr’s participation in the destruction of Syrian 
chemical weapons in 2014 and the 10 to 15 MPs who abstained in votes on the Bundeswehr’s 
deployment to Darfur and South Sudan.  
The Greens were the traditional home of the German peace movement and initially shared the 
Radical Left’s principled opposition to military missions. Even though the Bundeswehr’s early 
deployments were non-combat missions, the Greens consistently voted against them during 
Helmut Kohl’s third government between 1990 and 1994. Starting after the 1994 elections, 
however, the Greens embarked on a painful process of recalibrating their position on the use of 
force (Vollmer 1998). Spurred by future Foreign Minister Fischer, this process was highly 
conflictual but also signalled to the Social Democrats that a possible coalition would be feasible. 
When in government between 1998 and 2005, the share of no-votes dropped indeed but 
remained consistently above the share amongst Social Democrats. Back in opposition (from 2005 
on), the share of no-votes rose again but not to the level of pre-government period. A closer look 
shows that the Greens are especially divided over the Afghanistan missions. At the same time, 
their opposition against the Bundeswehr’s contribution to the EU-led maritime operation against 
human trafficking and their support for the missions in Darfur, South Sudan, Bosnia and Kosovo 
has been unanimous.  
Segments of the Social Democrats were almost as closely affiliated with the peace movement as 
the Greens. However, the ‘pacifist’ wing of the SPD was always outnumbered by a pragmatic 
majority that preferred diplomacy over the use of force but did not oppose force under all 
circumstances. By and large, therefore, the Social Democrats’ share of no-votes moves in parallel 
to the Greens’ but on a generally lower level. A turning point was the 2001 vote on “Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF)” that Schröder linked to a motion of confidence, thereby disciplining his 
own party to vote unanimously in favour of a mission that many MPs supported only lukewarm. 
However, the opposition to OEF remained and the Social Democrats resumed voting against it 
once back in opposition (with shares of no-votes between 100% in 2009 and 2010 and 98,5% in 
2011 and 2012).  
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Christian Democrats and Liberals were overall supportive of military missions. Of course, both 
parties voted against OEF when it was tied to the vote of confidence in Schröder (which explains 
the outlier position of the CDU/CSU in Figure 4 above). Apart from the 2001 OEF vote, there was 
some dissent on the mission to Macedonia in 2001 (61 no votes) and the DR Congo in 2003 (26 no 
votes). For the Liberals, the major exemption to the rule of supporting Bundeswehr deployments 
was their opposition to a German contribution to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) because of a possible conflict with Israel.  
For all parties under discussion, being in government or in opposition made a big difference.  
However, the government/opposition logic does not supersede the left/right cleavage entirely. 
When in government, the share of no votes never surpassed 1,5% for the Christian Democrats 
and the Liberals, whereas for Social Democrats and Greens it was above 4% in half of the cases. 
Spain  
The Spanish Congress has traditionally been considered a weak parliament, given the political 
culture of “presidentialism” (Montabes 2001) and strong intra-party discipline (Field 2013). 
However, a period of intense politicization of Spain’s foreign policy during the first half of the 
2000s led to the introduction of a parliamentary authorization procedure for military 
deployments in the Organic Law on National Defence of November 2005. The number of roll-call 
votes on military operations since 2005 is still quite low (10 votes), particularly when compared 
to the German Bundestag’s number of votes in the same period (see above). This is partly due to 
the fact that the threshold for the kind of operations that require parliamentary approval by the 
Spanish Congress is relatively high: roll-call plenary votes are usually only held for troop 
dispatches in new operations. Extensions of the operations and/or increase of troops in on-going 
missions have generally been voted in Committee or sometimes not voted at all.
15
 Actually, there 
is no clear practice yet on whether the prolongation or modification of the mandate of 
operations requires the authorization of parliament, a question that has sometimes sparked 
debate between government and opposition. 
                                              
15
  Since 2005 there have been 11 authorization votes in Committee, all of them approved with the votes of 
the PP and PSOE. 
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Compared to the other cases examined in this paper, a particularity of the voting pattern on 
military operations in the Spanish Congress is that the share of no-votes of the two main parties 
on the right (PP) and left (PSOE) is almost negligible. The established culture of inter-party 
foreign policy consensus (as well as intra-party discipline) is relevant to account for this pattern. 
The consensus among the two only ruling parties so far can be traced back to the goal of 
normalizing Spanish foreign policy after a long period of dictatorship, and in doing so achieving 
its full integration into the European and Atlantic security structures as a “middle power” (Del 
Arenal 2008:16). This trend was cemented during the first decade of transition to democracy, 
when the PSOE radically changed its position from being opposed to Spain’s accession to NATO in 
the early 1980s to campaigning for ‘yes’ to Spanish continuity within the Atlantic Alliance in a 
referendum in March 1986 organised by the Socialist government of Felipe González. The 
foreign-policy consensus built around Europe and the principle of multilateralism came to a 
rupture during the 2000-2004 parliamentary term, epitomized by the decision of the PP’s 
government to involve Spain in the US-led invasion of Iraq. The unprecedented parliamentary 
and public mobilization against the Iraq war was one of the main triggers for the introduction of 
the procedure of mandatory parliamentary authorization of military deployments.  
However, the voting data is in line with the left-right cleavage, in that the only political party 
consistently opposing military interventions is the radical-left IU. After the PSOE’s political 
volte-face on NATO during the 1980s, IU remained the sole standard-bearer of anti-Atlanticist 
and anti-militarist positions. The effect of IU on the total share of no-votes is moderated by the 
fact that this party has often voiced its reluctance to military operations with an abstention vote, 
not captured in Table 4. The five cases where IU abstained instead of voting against concern 
mostly UN-led operations (increase of Spanish troops in UNIFIL mission in Lebanon in 2006 and 
the UN operation in the Central African Republic in 2013) and EU military operations focussed on 
training or maritime surveillance (EUNAVFOR Atalanta in 2009, EUTM Somalia in 2010 and the 
more recent EUNAVFOR MED in 2015). The left-right cleavage is also visible in the regional 
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parties represented in the Spanish Congress (around 20-30 MPs in the three legislatures covered 
in table 4). Regardless of the party in government, left-wing regional parties have generally 
joined IU in voting against military operations (or abstaining)
16
, and regional right-wing/liberal 
parties voted consistently in favour. 
The political standstill that Spain is involved in since the general elections of December 2015 
does not allow for an analysis of the new parliamentary term. However, the seachange in the 
Spanish political map, in particular the increase in the number of radical-left MPs (from 22 to 
more than 80, including both the newly created Podemos and other regional left-wing parties), 
anticipates a growing politicization of decisions on troop dispatches. According to its latest party 
manifesto, Podemos has moderated its initially strong anti-NATO and anti-militarist rhetoric, 
but continues to propose a foreign policy based on disarmament, revision of relations with the 
Atlantic Alliance and the introduction of public consultations on decisions to send troops abroad 
(Podemos 2015:222-224). The left-right cleavage on military operations could hence become a 
more central trait of Spanish foreign policy and party politics in the years to come. 
United Kingdom
17
 
Parliamentary votes in the House of Commons on the use of military force are, historically, very 
rare. Indeed, no vote occurred to authorise deployment of military force between 1950, when 
parliament voted on troop deployment to Korea, and 2003, with the vote on U.K. participation in 
the Iraq war. This includes British military involvement in Suez, Oman, the Falklands, Iraq (in the 
first Gulf War), Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone (although parliamentary debates were held at 
times during British involvement in these conflicts). There is no legal requirement for 
parliamentary approval for the use of force. War powers are part of the Royal Prerogative – 
‘those powers left over from when the monarch was directly involved in government, powers 
that include making treaties, declaring war, deploying armed forces, regulating the civil service, 
and granting pardons. Prerogative powers are exercised, today, by government ministers. The 
defining characteristic of the prerogative is that its exercise does not require the approval of the 
Parliament’ (Poole 2010:146). Thus, the authority to deploy British armed forces resides in the 
collective responsibility of the cabinet, led by the prime minister (PM).  
                                              
16
  The most significant exceptions to this pattern are the yes-votes of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC) to the EU Atalanta operation in 2009 and to the NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011. 
17
  This section draws upon previous research by Kaarbo and Kenealy (2016). 
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PMs may, however, choose to seek parliamentary approval and PM Blair’s choice to do so for 
British participation in the Iraq war may have set a precedent for parliament’s involvement in 
matters of security. Indeed, five of the six votes on the use of military force since 1950 came 
during the recent governments led by PM Cameron. According to Strong (2014:2), ‘successive 
prime ministers have (…)allowed a political convention to develop granting parliament a veto 
over actual deployment decisions.’ The record of parliamentary involvement is, however, 
inconsistent, even in the recent years. The 2010 vote to continue deployments in Afghanistan, 
for example, occurred nine years after the introduction of British troops there. The 2011 vote on 
the use of force against Libya was post-hoc, after the mission had begun, and in 2013, the UK 
government deployed military assets and military personnel (in non-combat roles) to Mali 
without a parliamentary vote. 
Table 6: Analysis of Roll Call Votes in the UK
 
* = in government 
When votes were held, voting in the House of Commons followed similar patterns as in Germany 
and France: opposition to military deployments was more pronounced among Labour and Greens 
than among Conservatives and radical-right parties (there have been no MPs from radical-left 
parties). The largest regional parties, particularly the Scottish National Party, have generally 
opposed military deployments. With the exception of the Conservative Party, the share of no-
votes in government has always been smaller than in opposition. This finding is particularly 
pronounced amongst Liberal Democrats: all Liberal MPs voted against the Iraq war in 2003 but 
most of them voted for interventions in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Daesh in Iraq when in 
government. The 2015 vote on using force against Daesh in Syria again saw one out of four 
Liberal Democratics (returned to opposition) voting against the mission.  
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Internal party divisions are as important as cross-party differences in UK debates on the use of 
force. In the vote on UK participation in Iraq in 2003, most of the no-votes came from within 
Labour, PM Blair’s own party. Many of the no-votes on military strikes against Syria in 2013 
came from within the two coalition parties, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. This 
was unusual for the Conservatives, a party that has historically been more divided over issues 
like UK-EU relations than over security policy (Heppell 2013). Divisions within Labour continued 
in the 2015 vote on air strikes against Daesh. 
The 2013 vote on Syria was unusual in a number of other ways as well. MPs actually voted on 
two motions – one supported by the Government (Reflected in the figures in Table 5) and one 
introduced by Labour. There were only minor differences between the two motions; both called 
for a second vote before military action. The irony of the vote was that although most MPs 
supported the use of force (by voting for one motion or the other), since no motion gained 
majority support, UK participation in military strikes against Syria was taken off the table. As 
PM Cameron put it: ‘It’s clear to me that the British parliament and the British people do not wish 
to see military action; I get that, and I will act accordingly’.
18
 This outcome was unprecedented as 
it was the first defeat for a British PM on a security matter since 1782.
19
 
To some, recent parliamentary debates and votes reflect a growing scepticism on the use of force 
in the parliament and the British public, largely based on the experiences of the Iraq war (See 
Gaskarth 2014). Yet a majority of British MPs have endorsed military operations in all post-Iraq 
votes. In 2014, the same parliament that was divided over Syria, solidly supported force against 
Islamic State in Iraq, although here again, opposition did come from the left (some in Labour and 
the green MPs). In addition to this longer term trend of scepticism on the use of force, 
parliamentary voting on military deployments may become more politicized with changes in the 
party system. With the 2015 general election, the Scottish National Party, which generally 
opposes the use of military force, increased its share in the House of Commons from six to fifty-
four seats, becoming the third largest party in the parliament. As the post-Brexit referendum 
landscape saw further divisions within Labour and may foster more support for the radical right 
(in the form of UKIP) in the next general election, a more fragmented party system could lead to 
more distinct ideological positions in UK security policy. 
                                              
18
 Hansard 29 August 2013, Col. 1556. 
19
 In 1782 Lord North, then PM, lost a vote of no confidence following the British defeat at Yorktown. 
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CONCLUSION 
Military missions are no exception to the general trend towards politicization that has been 
noted in other issue areas. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the growing number of deployment 
votes and their party-political contestation all suggest that politicization has reached the hard 
core of national security and defence policy. 
Our analysis of deployment votes shows that they are often far from unanimous, although the 
level of agreement is usually higher than for other issues. Moreover, the four countries under 
study differ considerably as regards the degree of party political contestation when it comes to 
deployment votes. The ‘politics stops at the water’s edge’ idiom thus resonates more in Spain and 
partly so in France than in Germany and the United Kingdom. In all countries, however, votes 
against deployments drop considerably when a party enters government.  
We used CHES data and our own dataset on deployment votes to further examine the pattern of 
party-political contestation of military missions. We find that the left/right axis captures the 
pattern of party political contestation very well. Both the CHES and the voting data indicate 
growing support for military deployments as one moves from the Radical Left via Greens, 
Socialists and Liberals to Christian Democrats and Conservatives. As regards the Radical Right, 
however, the two datasets differ: the CHES data suggest an overall curvilinear relationship 
according to which support declines again as one moves from the Conservatives to the Radical 
Right. In contrast, our voting data suggest staunch radical right support for deployments, but the 
data are based on a very small number of cases. The few members of the Front National who were 
represented in the Assemblée nationale and the Sénat and the one UKIP member in the House of 
Commons after the 2015 elections are the only representatives of this party family in the four 
parliaments under study in this paper. Their votes in favour of deployments, however, may be 
deceptive as the Radical Right has been ambivalent on military missions. On the one hand, 
radical-right parties tend to accept the use of force as necessary to advance national interests; 
on the other hand, these parties tend to be isolationist and weary to engage in military missions 
for the sake of human rights or state building.  
Another party family whose policy on military missions warrants further study are regionalist 
parties. We have excluded them from the analysis in this paper mainly because they are only 
represented in two of the four parliaments under study. The country studies above suggest that 
their position on military missions may result from their position on the left/right axis with the 
Scottish National Party and several left regionalist parties in Spain voting against and several 
right regionalist parties in Spain voting in favour of deployments. However, only a more 
 26 
comprehensive examination can find out whether a regionalist identity makes parties show a 
critical distance from the central government’s military engagements.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to study systematically how voting cohesion amongst parties 
of the same family across countries compares to voting cohesion amongst the parties in the 
same country. Our data on the voting behaviour of the Radical Left suggests that for this party 
family, transnational cohesion may well be higher than national cohesion. However, additional 
research – and ideally additional data from further countries – is required to examine 
systematically to what extent there is a transnational party-political dimension in this core area 
of foreign and security policy.  
Additional case study research is also needed to investigate the rationales behind party voting 
on military missions. At the outset of this paper, we suggested three rationales for party 
contestation over military missions relating to foreign policy impact on domestic policy 
programs, genuine foreign policy differences, and differences that derive from the same core 
values and principled beliefs that underpin domestic policy orientations. Our data do not allow 
us to make conclusions on these rationales, and how parties balance policy commitments with 
political calculations. Our study does, nevertheless, suggest that countries’ positions on military 
missions are indeed contested, partisan, and politicized.   
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Appendix: Party classification in families according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, (only 
parties represented in parliament)  
 France Germany Spain United Kingdom 
Socialists Parti socialiste (PS)  Sozialdemokatische 
Partei 
Deutschlands (SPD)  
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(PSOE)  
Labour Party 
Conservatives Rassemblement 
pour la République 
(RPR) / Union pour 
un Movement 
Populaire (UMP) / 
Les Républicains  
 Partido 
Popular (PP) 
Conservative 
Party (CP) 
 
Christian 
Democratic 
 Christlich-
Demokratische 
Union (CDU); 
Christlich-Soziale 
Union (CSU) 
  
Liberals Nouveau centre 
(NC), 
Alliance centriste 
(AC) 
F.D.P. Unión, 
Progreso y 
Democracia; 
Ciudadanos 
Liberal 
Democrats 
Green Europe Ecologie Les 
Verts (EELV) 
Die Grünen 
  
 Green Party 
Radical Left Parti communiste 
français (PCF), 
Parti radical de 
gauche (PRG) 
PDS / Die Linke Izquierda 
Unida (IU); 
Podemos 
 
Radical Right Front national (FN); 
Mouvement pour la 
France (MPF) 
  United Kingdom 
Independent 
Party (UKIP) 
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